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ESSAYS
BIFURCATION OF CIVIL TRIALS
John P. Rowley III*
Richard G. Moore **
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite its widespread and long-standing recognition as a val-
uable docket-control device, the bifurcation of issues in civil trials
has generated considerable debate among legal scholars and
judges. The state and federal courts both utilize bifurcation, and
the Supreme Court of Appeals in Virginia recognized the advan-
tages of the procedural device as early as 1915. Nonetheless, au-
thority for the bifurcation of issues in civil trials in Virginia has
remained clouded. The Supreme Court of Virginia lifted at least
some of the clouds when it decided Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Wade, thereby rejecting the position taken in an amicus curiae
brief filed by the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association that bifurca-
tion is not authorized under Virginia law.' The court further clari-
fied the law of bifurcation when it issued its January 16, 2009
opinion in Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins.2 Nevertheless, some
doubts remain about the availability of the procedure in Virginia.
* John P. Rowley III is a litigation partner at Baker & Mckenzie L.L.P., Washington,
D.C.
** Richard G. Moore is a contract attorney at Holland & Knight L.L.P., McLean, Vir-
ginia, where he practices complex civil litigation. Mr. Moore is also a former Assistant
Judge Advocate General of the Navy (Military Law) and a retired United States Marine
Corps Brigadier General.
1. 265 Va. 383, 392, 394, 579 S.E.2d 180, 185-86 (2003); Brief for Va. Trial Lawyers
Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, at 10-11, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wade, 265 Va.
383, 579 S.E.2d 180 (2003) (No. 021201), 2002 WL 33002932.
2. 277 Va. 59, 78, 670 S.E.2d 708, 718 (2009) (stating that bifurcation of liability and
damages is the "most practical means" to prevent prejudice against the defendant).
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This article suggests that to clarify any remaining issues, the
Virginia General Assembly should enact legislation recognizing
discretionary judicial use of bifurcation in appropriate civil cases.
II. THE BIFURCATION OF CIVIL TRIALS, IN GENERAL3
The separate trial of issues is distinct in theory from the trial
of severed claims.4 However, this distinction is often obscured in
practice because, at times, courts interchangeably talk of sepa-
rate trials and severance.'
A bifurcated trial involves the "trial of issues separately."6 Bi-
furcation properly refers to issues, not claims. Bifurcation results
in separate trials, often called phases, of the bifurcated issues,
usually resulting in a single judgment.7 On the other hand, the
severance of claims divides a lawsuit into two or more separate
and independent causes, with the severed claims becoming en-
3. An excellent overview and historical treatment of the broad discretion of trial
judges to bifurcate issues in civil trial, both state and federal, can be found in Senior U.S.
District Judge Weinstein's decision in Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
4. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2387 (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010). Issues may also be trifurcated, for exam-
ple, separating not only the issues of liability and damages, but also adjudicating different
forms of damages or other issues, such as affirmative defenses. See id. § 2390. Some courts
have dealt with complex cases by using the practice of "reverse bifurcation," meaning
"try[ing] damages and sometimes causation first, followed by a determination of liability."
Id. (noting that a court may further separate the liability phase of the trial into multiple
stages when each liability phase depends upon a different theory of liability); see also Si-
mon, 200 F.R.D. at 25, 32 (discussing both trifurcation and reverse bifurcation). The ABA
Journal E-Report for December 10, 2004 reported that judges throughout the country uti-
lized reverse bifurcation to more efficiently manage the trials of fen-phen cases, based
upon the prior successful use of reverse bifurcation in asbestos cases. Molly McDonough,
Going Forward with Reverse Bifurcation, ABA J. E-REP. (ABA, Chicago, Ill.), Dec. 10,
2004, at 4.
5. See, e.g., Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1122 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1999) (recognizing that while "courts generally use the terms sever and separate in-
terchangeably, they are analytically distinct . . . . 'Separate trials will usually result in one
judgment, but severed claims become entirely independent actions to be tried, and judg-
ment entered thereon, independently."' (quoting McDaniel v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 987
F.2d 298, 304 n.19 (5th Cir. 1993))).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 163 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added); accord 75 AM. JUR.
2D Trial § 58 (2007) ('"Bifurcated trials' are trials in which only some of the issues of the
case will be resolved at one trial, with the rest left for a further trial or other proceed-
ings.").
7. See Opinion of the Clerk, Supreme Court of Ala., 526 So. 2d 584, 586 (Ala. 1988);
75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 58 (2007); 88 C.J.S. Trial § 17 (2001 & Supp. 2009); 9A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 4, § 2387.
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tirely distinct actions to be tried, with judgment independently
entered."
This article is not a promotional for the bifurcation of all civil
trials. Indeed, the typical civil trial is a unitary trial, as the sepa-
rate trial of issues is not the usual course.9 Nevertheless, the bi-
furcation of issues in civil trials can be an effective device for
docket control and reduction of the expense and duration of trials,
and should be utilized more often. While bifurcation has its crit-
ics,1o and can implicate Seventh Amendment issues regarding the
use of separate juries when a second jury reexamines a fact tried
8. See Houseman, 171 F.3d at 1122 n.5 (quoting McDaniel, 987 F.2d at 304 n.19);
Opinion of the Clerk, Supreme Court of Ala., 526 So. 2d at 586; 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 58
(2007); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1498 (9th ed. 2009); 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4,§ 2387.
9. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 59 (2007); 88 C.J.S. Trial § 17 (2001 & Supp. 2009); 9A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2388; William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary
Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 99 (1993).
10. See, e.g., Albert F. Brault, The Issues of Liability and of Damages in Tort Cases
Should Not Be Separated for the Purposes of Trial, 1960 A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. &
COMPENSATION L. 274, 277-80 (arguing the presentation of issues in negligence suits is
most appropriately a composite picture and that bifurcation may, in many cases, actually
frustrate rather than promote judicial economy); Philip H. Corboy, Will Split Trials Solve
Court Delay? A Negative Response, 52 ILL. B.J. 1004, 1016-23 (1964) (arguing that bifur-
cation efficiency statistics are overstated); Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards,
Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV.
505, 505 (1995) (arguing that bifurcation undermines jurors' ability to make informed,
broad-based decisions and should rarely be utilized); Landes, supra note 9, at 101 (identi-
fying economic advantages and disadvantages of bifurcation); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass
Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 69 (arguing the bifurcation
or trifurcation of issues in mass trials is neither fair nor efficient); Charles Alan Wright,
The Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A. J. 742, 747 (1966) ("We
should be wary of reforms that are attractive in terms of saving time but have unnoticed
substantive effects."); Sandra A. Smith, Comment, Polyfurcation and the Right to a Civil
Jury Trial: Little Grace in the Woburn Case, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 649, 681-85
(1998) (arguing that bifurcation undermines the traditional fact-finding process and the
development of the law). Judge Jack B. Weinstein's initial reservations about bifurcation,
expressed while a Professor at Columbia University, stand in contrast to his views on the
bifurcation of issues in civil trials that he articulated while serving as a federal judge for
the Eastern District of New York. Compare Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury
Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L.
REV. 831 (1961) (arguing judicial economy justifications for discretionary bifurcation rules
are inadequate given the potential impact on the balance of substantive rights as between
litigants), with Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 25-51 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (Wein-
stein, J.) (approving discretionary bifurcation wherever appropriate, including the bifurca-
tion of general compensatory liability issues from both punitive damages issues and indi-
vidual compensatory issues).
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by a first jury," it finds vigorous support among a significant
number of scholarsl2 and courts. 3
11. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1931); see 5
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 42.03[2] (2d ed. 1996); The
Commercial & Fed. Litig. Section of the N.Y. State Bar, The Mini-Trial: Bifurcation as an
Efficient Device to Promote the Resolution of Civil Cases, 53 ALB. L. REV. 19, 23-31 (1988)
[hereinafter N.Y. State Bar, The Mini-Trial]; J.D. Page & Doug Sigel, Bifurcated Trials in
Texas Practice: The Advantages of Greater Use of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 174(b), 9
REV. LITIG. 49, 57-59 (1990); Note, Separate Trials on Liability and Damages in '7?outine
Cases'" A Legal Analysis, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1059, 1069-75 (1962) [hereinafter Note, Sepa-
rate Trials on Liability and Damages in 'Routine Cases']. When bifurcation involves two
juries, it may violate the Seventh Amendment where (1) the defendant opposes, or per-
haps merely acquiesces, to the procedure and (2) the issue bifurcated is so interwoven with
other issues in the case that it cannot be submitted to the jury independently without such
confusion and uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial. 9A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 4, § 2391; G. Lee Garrett, Jr. & Anthony E. Diresta, Strategies for
Multi-Claim Litigation and Settlement Techniques, in PRODUCT LIABILITY OF
MANUFACTURERS: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE 1985, at 473, 526-28 (PLI Lit. & Admin.
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 289, 1985); see also In re Bradle, 83 S.W.3d 923, 926-
28 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding bifurcation of punitive damages unconstitutional because the
second jury is deprived of the totality of the evidence, which is essential to the require-
ment that punitive damages be proportional to the gravity and severity of the misconduct
in issue and the injury sustained); Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L.
REV. 705, 729-37 (2000) (analyzing the constitutional contours of using separate juries in
bifurcated trials and concluding that the prevailing presumption against issue bifurcation
is unwarranted); W. Russell Taber, The Re-examination Clause: Exploring Bifurcation in
Mass Tort Litigation, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 63 passim (2006) (exploring the validity of the use
of separate juries under the Re-examination Clause and outlining strategies to avoid po-
tential constitutional pitfalls).
Seventh Amendment issues can also be implicated in the bifurcation of antitrust claims,
where courts must grapple with whether the "fact of damages" element is part of the lia-
bility phase or the damages phase. See Geraldine Alexis & Andrea DeShazo, Punitive
Damages: Is Bifurcation Right for Your Case?, 16 ANTITRUST 82, 82, 85-86 (2002). The
problem of having a second jury find no antitrust injury where the first jury found liability
presents a Seventh Amendment problem. Id. at 82. But see In re High Fructose Corn Sy-
rup Antitrust Litig., 361 F.3d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that inconsistent findings
of jurors in bifurcated antitrust litigation, where jurors hear different evidence, is a differ-
ence "in result rather than logic," which does not give rise to a Seventh Amendment prob-
lem). Other courts have permitted the trial of bifurcated issues by separate juries where
the second jury does not impermissibly re-examine any fact tried by the first jury. Amato
v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding bifurcation of a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 452 n.5 (3d Cir.
1997) (upholding bifurcation of causation issues relating to exposure to PCB's and the is-
sue of liability), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 221 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 2000); EEOC v.
Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926, 957-58 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (bifurcating issues of liability
damages in a "pattern or practice" employment discrimination case); Marvin Lumber &
Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., No. 4-95-739, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25417, at *12-14 (D. Minn.
2001) (bifurcating warranty of future performance questions from other issues in the dis-
pute), affrd in part and remanded, 401 F.3d 901, 920 (8th Cir. 2005); Simon, 200 F.R.D. at
49-51 (permitting bifurcation of general compensatory liability and punitive damages is-
sues, and separate trials on the issues of general and compensatory liability).
12. See, e.g., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS §
3.06 (1994) (discussing the potential benefits and justifications of issue bifurcation in com-
plex litigation); Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from
[Vol. 45:14
BIFURCATION OF CIVIL TRIALS
An article by Professor Steven S. Gensler discusses and rebuts
many of the arguments previously made against bifurcation.14
These arguments are based on theories that the Advisory Com-
mittee Note to the 1966 Amendment to Federal Rules of Civil
Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 767-68 (1991) (noting that bifurcation may aid
jury comprehension, remove bias, and conserve judicial resources); Gensler, supra note 11,
at 782-83 ("[Bifurcation] holds great promise for increasing efficiency by eliminating un-
necessary trial time. .. . [A]vailable evidence suggests that aggressive bifurcation of liabil-
ity and damages alone could yield savings of as much as 20%."); Lewis Mayers, The Sever-
ance of Trial Liability from Damage, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 389, 393-94 (1938) (discussing the
advantages of issue bifurcation in negligence actions); Julius H. Miner, Court Congestion:
A New Approach, 45 A.B.A. J. 1265, 1268 (1959) (discussing the myriad advantages of bi-
furcating civil actions); N.Y. State Bar, The Mini-Trial, supra note 11, at 31 ("[Glreater
use of mini-trials would promote judicial economy."); Page & Sigel, supra note 11, at 51;
George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527,
557 (1989) (stating that bifurcation may reduce congestion, albeit not to the extent other
scholars have predicted); Warren F. Schwartz, Severance-A Means of Minimizing the
Role of Burden and Expense in Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV.
1197, 1200 (1967) (arguing that efficiency gains from bifurcation can be captured without
impairing the judicial process); William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 143-44 (1990) (listing bifurcation among several methods for improv-
ing jury trials); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
95, 156-58 (1996) (stating that bifurcation conserves resources, improves jury comprehen-
sion of issues, and minimizes juror prejudice); L.H. Vogel, The Issues of Liability and of
Damages in Tort Cases Should Be Separated for the Purposes of Trial, 1960 A.B.A. SEC.
INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 265, 26&-70 (arguing that issue bifurcation will relieve
dockets overburdened with complex litigation and reduce prejudice to defendants stem-
ming from jury bias); Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A
Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1624-25 (1963) (analyzing empirical data and
concluding that issue bifurcation could potentially make the judicial system twenty per-
cent more efficient); Thomas D. Aitken, Comment, Trial Practice: Separate Trials on the
Issues of Liability and Damages, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 114, 121-22 (1964) (stating that issue
bifurcation improves judicial economy, reduces jury confusion, and mitigates jury bias);
Albert P. Bedecarr6, Comment, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme: Polyfurcation of
Liability Issues in Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 123, 160-61
(1989) (proposing guidelines for balancing the efficiency of issue bifurcation with fairness
concerns); Thomas E. Maloney, Comment, Implications of Bifurcation in the Ordinary
Negligence Case, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 99, 100 (1964) (stating that issue bifurcation improves
judicial economy, reduces jury confusion, and mitigates jury bias).
13. Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of
State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cas-
es, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 743-45 (1989) (reporting that 94% of federal judges surveyed had
bifurcated at least one case and 84% of the judges surveyed felt that bifurcation helped the
judicial process); see also LoCicero v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 52 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La.
1971) ("If a separate trial of part of the issues may make unnecessary the trial of other
issues it is only reasonable to follow the course which saves the time of the court and re-
duces the expenses of the parties."' (quoting 2B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 943 (Wright ed. 1961))); Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral
Corp., 257 F. Supp. 619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("When there is a possibility, . . . of shorten-
ing the trial considerably by holding a separate trial on an issue, the court should exercise
its discretion and try the issue separately if such a procedure will not prejudice either
side.") (internal citation omitted).
14. Gensler, supra note 11.
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Procedure Rule 42 created a presumption against bifurcation;'6
that bifurcation is pro-defendant;' 6 that bifurcation infringes on
the proper role of the civil jury;7 and that bifurcation may create
a "sterile trial environment" where plaintiffs cannot present their
entire case before juries.'8 A number of other commentators have
analyzed or discussed the effect of bifurcated litigation on trial
outcome, particularly from the perspective of whether bifurcation
favors the plaintiff or the defendant, 9 and counsel may be swayed
by these commentators to seek or reject bifurcation in a particu-
lar case. The careful litigator, however, will want to read those
discussions in light of Professor Gensler's detailed and compelling
analytical article before opposing bifurcation.
While individual plaintiffs and defendants may have varying
personal opinions regarding when and how bifurcation should be
used, Professor Gensler compellingly demonstrates that there is
no empirical evidence to support, much less to conclude, that bi-
furcation of civil trials favors either the plaintiff or the defen-
dant.2 0 Moreover, whether bifurcation is appropriate in any par-
15. See id. passim. Gensler also notes, however, that "[a] presumption for bifurcation
might be just as bad as a presumption against bifurcation." Id. at 714; see also Simon, 200
F.R.D. at 27. In Simon, Senior District Judge Weinstein considered that the Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 42(b), taken as a whole, "did not limit in any way the trial judge's
historic discretion to sever issues for trial in individual cases." 200 F.R.D. at 27.
16. See Gensler, supra note 11, at 741.
17. See id. at 748-64.
18. See id. at 764-71.
19. See, e.g., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS
§ 3.06 cmt. f (1994); Alexis & deShazo, supra note 11, at 83-84; Brian H. Bornstein, From
Compassion to Compensation: The Effect of Injury Severity on Mock Jurors' Liability
Judgments, 28 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1477, 1487-92 (1998); Doyle W. Curry & Rose-
mary T. Snider, Bifurcated Trials: How to Avoid Them-How to Win Them, 24 TRIAL, Mar.
1988, at 47; Dan Cytryn, Bifurcation In Personal Injury Cases: Should Judges Be Allowed
to Use the "B" Word?, 26 NOVA L. REV. 249, 254-59 (2001); Andrew L. Frey & Dennis P.
Orr, Litigating Damages: Actual and Punitive, 29 LITIG., Winter 2003, at 33, 36 (2003);
Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting De-
vices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505, 513 (1995); Paula L. Hannaford et al.,
How Judges View Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 247, 260 (1998); Irwin A. Horowitz &
Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort
Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 275-84 (1990); Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful
What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages,
1998 Wis. L. REV. 297, 308-30; Meiring de Villiers, A Legal and Policy Analysis of Bifur-
cated Litigation, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 153, 182-96; Wright, supra note 10, at 747;
Ziesel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1609-12. The New Jersey Supreme Court has also
encouraged judges to utilize New Jersey Rule 4:38-2(b), providing for permissive bifurca-
tion of liability and damage issues. N.J. Sup. Ct. Directive No. 3-77 (1977).
20. Gensler, supra note 11, at 745, 783.
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ticular case is essentially a fact-driven determination.21 Further,
the decision to grant or decline bifurcation is entirely within the
sole discretion of the court, and that decision is informed by objec-
tive considerations that are not weighted in favor of the parochial
litigation interests of one litigant or another.22 Those controlling
considerations include the interests of justice, the avoidance of
undue prejudice or hardship to one or both of the parties, the cla-
rification or simplification of the proceedings or issues, judicial ef-
ficiency or economy, avoidance of jury confusion, reduction of the
duration or expenses of trial, facilitation of settlement, avoidance
of inconsistent jury verdicts, or speeding a just determination of
the case. 23 In the absence of the court directing bifurcation sua
sponte, either party may advance or oppose a motion for bifurca-
tion, but the court's decision will rest entirely on one or more of
the foregoing considerations, and not upon whether bifurcation
will provide a more favorable litigation posture for either liti-
gant.24
Support for selective bifurcation can be found in federal prac-
tice and the statutes of various states. For example, New York
encourages judges "to order a bifurcated trial of the issues of lia-
bility and damages in [personal injury actions] where it appears
that bifurcation may assist in a clarification or simplification of
[the] issues and a fair and more expeditious resolution of the ac-
tion."25 New Jersey mandates bifurcated trials in "[a]ny actions
involving punitive damages ... ,if requested by any defendant,"2 6
as does Texas.27 Indeed, as Professor Gensler notes, "many states
encourage-or even require-bifurcating punitive-damage is-
sues. "28 To date Virginia has not done so, albeit, as noted subse-
quently, in 1994 there was an unsuccessful legislative attempt to
require bifurcation of the issue of punitive damages, at the defen-
dant's request, 29 and in 2004 Virginia circuit court denied the re-
21. See 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2388 (discussing different factual issues
that may lead a court to bifurcate a trial).
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 202.42, 206.19 (2008).
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13(a) (West 2000).
27. See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30 (Tex. 1994).
28. Gensler, supra note 11, at 740 n.211 (citing James R. McKown, Punitive Damages:
State Trends and Developments, 14 REV. LITIG. 419, 446-53 (1995)).
29. See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
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quest of a defendant insurance company to bifurcate the issue of
punitive damages, giving no reason for the denial.3o In the federal
courts, since the advent of Rule 42(b),31 bifurcation of issues in
civil trials has been widely used "in furtherance of convenience or
to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to
expedition and economy."32 The majority of states that have
adopted statutes and rules comparable or identical to Rule 42(b)
have had similar experiences."
Underlying the exercise of judicial discretion3 4 in whether to bi-
furcate issues for separate trial are certain determinations
beyond those embodied in Rule 42(b) and its state analogues. In
this connection, bifurcation is appropriate as a flexible and useful
instrument to avoid confusion, and to provide a convenient me-
30. McLean v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., No. 31799V-04, 2004 WL 2813474, at *2 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 25, 2004) (Newport News City).
31. In the federal courts, Rule 42(b) authorizes the bifurcation of issues; the severabil-
ity of claims is authorized by Rule 21. See 5 MOORE, supra note 11, 1 42.03[1].
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). Any one of these standards is sufficient to justify bifurcation.
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2388.
Examples of the "to avoid prejudice" prerequisite for bifurcation are when evidence ad-
missible solely for one issue (e.g., damages) may cause jury prejudice on another issue (e.g.
liability), or the jury may learn a defendant is insured in a unitary trial. See id. However,
the avoidance of prejudice contemplated by Rule 42(b) has been held not to "come into play
[when] the action is tried by the court." In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D.
310, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (citing United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 60 F.R.D. 654,
656 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
33. Outside Virginia, most states and the District of Columbia authorize some degree
of bifurcation of issues in some instances by means of judicial decision, but usually by
rules of court or statues embodying the essential language of Rule 42(b). For example, a
Connecticut statute permits the court in all civil actions, whether by jury or bench trial, to
"order [] one or more of the issues joined [to] be tried before the others." CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-205 (2005). Case law makes it clear that such bifurcation of the issues may be the sua
sponte action of the trial court. Swenson v. Sawoska, 559 A.2d 1153, 1156 (Conn. App. Ct.
1989), affd, 575 A.2d 206 (Conn. 1990). Louisiana limits bifurcation to issues of liability
and damages, if consented to by all parties. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 1562 (2010). Ne-
braska, by statute, addresses only the bifurcation of the issue of the bar of the statute of
limitations, upon motion of any party, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-221 (2006), but case law sup-
ports the broad discretion of the trial court to bifurcate other issues in civil actions. See
Mondelli v. Kendel Homes Corp., 631 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Neb. 2001) (impliedly approving
the parties' bifurcation of liability and damages); Yopp v. Batt, 467 N.W.2d 868, 879 (Neb.
1991). But see Iley v. Hughes, 311 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1958) (disapproving of different
juries determining contested liability and damage issues in a personal injury claim). Si-
mon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 31 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), contains a representative
overview and summary of the various states' rules and statutes granting state trial judges
broad discretion to bifurcate issues for trial. See also Cytryn, supra note 19, at 253-54 (re-
viewing the case law of states other than Florida dealing with bifurcation).
34. In jurisdictions where bifurcation is authorized, the decision to bifurcate a civil
trial is one committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Simon, 200 F.R.D. at
25; 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, at § 2388.
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thod of disposing of litigation as fairly and quickly as possible.35
Philosophically and practically, the interest of efficient judicial
administration should control. Therefore, bifurcation is appropri-
ate if a single issue could be dispositive of the entire case or is
likely to lead the parties to negotiate a settlement, or if resolution
of the issue might make it unnecessary to try the other issues in
the litigation.36 Courts favor bifurcation of liability and damages,
because a finding of no liability is case-dispositive.3 7 On the other
side of the same coin, a finding of liability often furnishes an im-
petus for the defendant to seek to negotiate settlement.38 Bifurca-
tion is also appropriate if it would simplify or clarify the proceed-
ings; permit a more orderly disposition of the case; reduce
hardship to the parties; speed a just determination; promote a
logical presentation to, or avoid confusion of, the jury; reduce the
discovery time period; avoid possibly inconsistent jury verdicts; or
otherwise be in the interests of justice.39
Those same philosophical and practical determinations make
bifurcation inappropriate where the burdens of a separate trial
outweigh the benefits, such as when the separate trial of an issue
will involve extensive proof of substantially the same facts and
examination of the same witnesses as the other issues; inconve-
nience the court; prejudice the rights of the parties; cause undue
expense; or require the expenditure of additional time when com-
pared to a unitary trial."0 Bifurcation is also inappropriate where
multiple issues are intertwined, or are identical or closely re-
35. See 88 C.J.S. Trial § 9 (2001 & Cum. Supp. 2007); 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 4, § 2387.
36. See Kiser v. Bryant Elec. (In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig.), 695 F.2d 207, 216 (6th
Cir. 1982) ("[W]hether resolution of a single issue would likely be dispositive of an entire
claim is highly relevant in determining the efficacy of bifurcation."); 9A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 4, § 2388.
37. See Jarrett v. Town of Yarmouth, 331 F.3d 140, 151 (1st Cir. 2003); Amato v. City
of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999).
38. See de Villiers, supra note 19, at 184 ("Bifurcated trials almost always result in
settlement of damages after a pro-plaintiff liability verdict."); Maloney, supra note 12, at
104-05.
39. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 65 (2007); see also Gensler, supra note 11, at 772
C'Mhe available evidence indicates that the presumption against bifurcation probably
hinders judicial efficiency.").
40. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 69 (2007).
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lated, 4 1 so that bifurcation of one issue may not be had without in-
justice to the trial of the remaining issues.42
The bifurcation of liability and damages occurs most frequently
in personal injury actions, but it is a procedure equally useful in
other tort and contract cases.4 1 Indeed, "[o]rdering separate trials
of liability and damages . .. was commonplace in the seventeenth-
century [common-law] action of account-render."44 "Equitable ac-
counting actions were also regularly bifurcated into liability and
damages phases."45
Contract issues may also be appropriate for a bifurcated trial.
The interpretation of a significant contract term may be particu-
larly appropriate for resolution in a bifurcated proceeding.46 So
too with a separate trial on the issues of the existence or the ge-
nuineness of a contract, and its validity under the statute of
frauds, which in many cases should be decided before a trial of
the issues of breach and damages.47 Bifurcation is also appropri-
41. Id.; see also Britton v. Farmers Ins. Group (Truck Ins. Exch.), 721 P.2d 303, 320
(Mont. 1986).
42. See Ennix v. Clay, 703 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tenn. 1986) (citing Gasoline Prods. Co. v.
Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931)).
43. The benefits of a bifurcated issue of liability are not limited to personal injury cas-
es. For example, a finding of breach of contract leaves only the remedy for decision; there-
fore, the finding of breach is a determination of liability. See Providence Journal Co. v.
Providence Newspaper Guild, 271 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (construing arbitration bifur-
cated into issues of liability and damages); see also 5 MOORE, supra note 11, 42.03[1]; 9A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2390; Mayers, supra note 12, at 393; Vogel, supra note
12, at 267, 269; Aitken, supra note 12; Note, Original Separate Trials on Issues of Damag-
es and Liability, 48 VA. L. REV. 99, 99-101 (1962) [hereinafter Note, Original Separate
Trial on Issues]; Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Propriety of Ordering Separate Tri-
als as to Liability and Damages, Under Rule 42(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in
Contract Actions, 79 A.L.R. FED. 812, 812-19 (1986) (discussing multiple situations in
which courts have elected to bifurcate).
44. Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 25-26 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Mayers,
supra note 12, at 391). It appears, however, that at common law, bifurcation was permit-
ted only in an action for account-render. See John J. Watkins, The Right to Trial By Jury
in Arkansas After Merger of Law and Equity, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 649, 706 &
n.345 (2002) (finding no bifurcation of liability and damages at common law (citing Marga-
ret Gammill, Note, Civil Procedure Rule 42(b)-Bifurcation of the Issues of Liability and
Damages at Trial, 5 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L.J. 405, 406 (1982))).
45. Simon, 200 F.R.D. at 26 (citing Mayers, supra note 12 at 391).
46. See, e.g., N. Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 574 F.2d 582, 587 n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1978) ('The separate issue which the court addressed ... involved the most critical ques-
tion in the litigation and was a very appropriate subject for bifurcated consideration."); see
also Gensler, supra note 11, at 726-27 (providing many recent examples of judges bifur-
cating issues in contract cases, such as "affirmative defenses, liability and damages, and
punitive damages") (footnotes omitted).
47. See Canister Co. v. Nat'l Can Corp., 3 F.R.D. 279, 280 (D. Del. 1943); see also
10 [Vol. 45:1
BIFURCATION OF CIVIL TRIALS
ate for other contract issues, such as duress; the capacity to con-
tract; third-party beneficiary status; authenticity of a signature;
and the parties' rights under contract modification, extension or
cancellation.48 The issue of breach is, of course, the issue of liabili-
ty, which may appropriately be bifurcated from the issue of dam-
ages.49
A partial list of issues appropriate for bifurcation in other cases
includes: jurisdiction; venue; pleas in abatement; discharge in
bankruptcy; capacity to sue; authenticity of signature; affirmative
defenses, such as statute of limitations, estoppel, laches, res judi-
cata, and statute of frauds; various tort issues, such as agency,
degrees of negligence, scope of employment, and place of an acci-
dent; issues raised by a counterclaim, third-party claim, or cross-
claim;,5 the validity of a release;51 whether a dry dock was a ves-
sel;52 whether a flood was an Act of God;53 the validity of a mining
claim;54 prior art;55 and the issues of validity, title, infringement
and damages in patent and copyright cases,56 unless it would "in-
Burkhard v. Burkhard, 175 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1948); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 131
(2007) (noting the discretion of the trial judge).
48. See, e.g., K.N.B. v. M.C. (In re Interest of N.Z.B. and M.T.B.), 779 So. 2d 508, 511
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Zupan v. Zupan, 576 N.Y.S.2d 616, 616 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
49. See Brom v. Bozell, Jacobs, Kenyon & Eckhardt, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 686, 689 (N.D.
Ill. 1994); Witherbee v. Honeywell, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 27, 29 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Kimber-
ly-Clark Corp. v. James River Corp. of Va., 131 F.R.D. 607, 608-09 (N.D. Ga. 1989)); Acme
Resin Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
50. See 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2389; Garrett & Diresta, supra note 11,
at 508-16; N.Y. State Bar, The Mini-Trial, supra note 11, at 19-23. "[The Sixth Circuit
has recognized that 'separate trials on a statute of limitations issue are particularly ap-
propriate' when a decision on that issue would minimize court time and litigation ex-
penses." Yacub v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 85 F. Supp. 2d 817, 828 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (quoting
Yung v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 1986)).
51. See, e.g., Bowie v. Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49, 50-51 (4th Cir. 1953).
52. Bernardo v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 200 F. Supp. 534, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
53. Huffmaster v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
54. United States v. Mulligan, 177 F. Supp. 384, 385 (D. Or. 1959).
55. Hall Lab. v. Nat'1 Aluminate Corp., 95 F. Supp. 323, 325-26 (D. Del. 1951).
56. See, e.g., Novopharm Ltd. v. Torpharm, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 308, 312 (E.D.N.C. 1998);
Eaton Corp. v. Auburn Gear Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1373, 1374 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (noting
that patent cases are often uniquely amenable to bifurcation); Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1112, 1116-17 (D.
Del. 1984). But see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996)
(holding that construction of patent claims, including disputed terms of art within such
claims, is a question of law reserved for court, not a matter subject to the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial; and whether infringement occurred is a question of fact
for a jury); see also Steven M. Bauer et al., First Markman, Now Festo: A Simplified Ap-
proach to Patent Litigation Trials, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 73, 78 (2003) (suggesting bifurcation
of infringement issues within a process that ends with a combined Markman-Festo and
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convenience the court or seriously prejudice the rights of some of
the parties."57
The issue of punitive damages is properly bifurcated from the
issues of liability and compensatory damages, where evidence as
to the existence or amount of punitive damages may be prejudi-
cial to consideration of those other issues.58 The issue of causation
of a loss, for example, by fire, is properly bifurcated from the issue
of liability among numerous defendants and the issue of damag-
es. 9 Employment discrimination cases also lend themselves to the
bifurcation of issues.- In a products liability case, it is proper to
bifurcate the issue of whether the defendant manufactured, de-
signed, or sold the product.61 In insurance cases, the issues of cov-
erage and whether the insurer acted in bad faith are appropriate-
ly bifurcated. 62 In cases involving the Federal Tort Claims Act, it
is proper to bifurcate the issue of whether the plaintiff presented
a timely administrative claim,6 3 an issue which is also often
present in state court suits against a sovereign defendant. Fur-
ther, in class action litigation, the courts often bifurcate the issue
of class certification from the merits.6 4
summary judgment hearing); Thomas L. Creel & Robert P. Taylor, Bifurcation, Trifurca-
tion, Opinions of Counsel, Privilege and Prejudice, in WINNING STRATEGIES IN PATENT
LITIGATION 1995, at 823, 825 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.,
Course Handbook Serv. No. G4-3952, 1995) (discussing appropriate uses of bifurcation in
patent litigation).
57. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1964).
58. See Mattison v. Dall. Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 110 (4th Cir. 1991); Simpson v.
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1990). As previously discussed,
"many state [statutes] encourage-or even require-bifurcating punitive-damage issues."
Gensler, supra note 11, at 740 n.211.
59. Kiser v. Bryant Elec. (In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig.), 695 F.2d 207, 216-17 (6th
Cir. 1982).
60. Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 618-19 (4th Cir. 1984).
61. Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 541-42 (8th Cir. 1977).
62. O'Malley v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 776 F.2d 494, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1985); see also
Schmidt v. Cal. State Auto. Ass'n, 127 F.R.D. 182, 185 (D. Nev. 1989) (bifurcating breach
of contract and tort claims in an insurance case).
63. Joplin v. United States, 74 F.R.D. 4, 5-6 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
64. See, e.g., Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D. 236, 238 (E.D. Mich.
1997); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.14 (2004).
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In the absence of contrary statutory mandate or guidance, 65
there is general consensus on the order in which bifurcated issues
should be tried. Logically and practically, an issue that, "if de-
cided in the defendant's favor will dispose of the whole case,
should be tried first[,] . . . and issues of law should be determined
before proceeding to the determination of issues of fact."6 6 When
liability and damages are bifurcated, the issue of liability should
be tried first.67 Legal issues are generally tried before equitable
issues where the right to trial by jury is implicated.6 8 In cases in-
volving punitive damages, the issues of liability and compensato-
ry damages should be tried before the issue of whether punitive
damages should be awarded,69 and the latter issue tried before the
issue of the amount thereof.70 In any bifurcated trial, however, in
the absence of statutory mandate,71 determination of which issue
should be tried first is left to the discretion of the trial court.72
65. In New York, for example, when issues of liability and damages are bifurcated in a
personal injury action, "the issue of liability shall be tried first, unless the court orders
otherwise." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 202.42(b), 206.19(b) (2008). In New
Jersey, where punitive damages are bifurcated at the request of a defendant, statute pre-
scribes the order in which the issues are to be tried, with no room for judicial discretion.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13 (West 2000).
66. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 10 (1955); see Mitchell v. Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank, 164 S.E.
136, 137 (S.C. 1932); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 165 (2007).
67. See sources cited supra note 4.
68. 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2388 ("If, however, issues of fact are com-
mon to both the legal and the equitable claims and a jury has been demanded on the is-
sues material to the legal claim, a jury must be permitted to determine these issues prior
to decision of the equitable claim.") (citing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479
(1962)); accord Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 962 (9th Cir. 2001); Dollar Sys.,
Inc. v. Avcar Leasing Sys., Inc., 890 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir. 1989). If, however, "the legal
and equitable claims do not involve common issues, the district court has discretion to re-
gulate the order of trial." Granite State Ins. Co. v. Smart Modular Techs., Inc., 76 F.3d
1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Dollar Sys., Inc., 890 F.2d at 170-71).
69. This is consistent with Virginia law, under which an award of compensatory dam-
ages "is an indispensable predicate for an award of punitive damages, except in actions for
libel and slander." Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 227 Va. 154, 159, 313 S.E.2d 384, 388
(1984) (citing Newspaper Publ'g Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 805, 224 S.E.2d 132, 136
(1976)); accord Peacock Buick, Inc. v. Durkin, 221 Va. 1133, 1137 n.3, 277 S.E.2d 225, 227
n.3 (1981).
70. See Frey & Orr, supra note 19, at 36 ("In most states, the defendant is entitled to
have a bifurcated proceeding consisting of a first phase in which all issues are tried except
amount of punitive damages, and a second, depending upon the verdict, in which the
amount of punitive damages is set.").
71. For example, Georgia requires bifurcation of the entitlement to punitive damages
and setting the amount thereof, with the issue of entitlement to be tried first. GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d) (2000).
72. See Miller v. Am. Bonding Co., 257 U.S. 304, 308 (1921).
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An in-depth analysis of the positions of those who support and
criticize the bifurcation of civil trials73 clearly reflects that bifur-
cation significantly assists in the maintenance of docket controP4
and reduces the expense and duration of trials. 5 Indeed, one
study, concluding that bifurcation is a powerful remedy for court
congestion, reflected that "[s]eparation of issues will save, on the
average, about 20 percent of the time that would be required if
these cases were tried under traditional rules."76 In the same vein,
an exhaustive study of bifurcation in the federal courts under
Rule 42(b) concluded: "[O]n the whole the separate trial has
proved a very flexible and useful instrument for preventing con-
fusion, avoiding prejudice, and providing a convenient method of
disposing of litigation as fairly and quickly as possible. The rule
serves its purpose in modern pleading.""
Other commentators accord with this view. Page and Siegel ex-
plained:
The federal model provides a mechanism to conserve judicial re-
sources, save litigants time and money, and improve the quality of
the fact-finding process. In this age of crowded dockets, soaring legal
costs, and declining public confidence in the legal system, courts
should use bifurcation in all cases in which appropriate grounds for
bifurcated trial exist.78
These observations about the efficacy of bifurcation in the fed-
eral courts provide a powerful incentive for the full utilization of
this docket-control and litigation-efficiency device in state courts,
where appropriate.
73. Compare supra note 10, with supra note 12.
74. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1199 ("[The alleviation of calendar congestion [is]
the principal end served by severance."); Bedecarr6, supra note 12, at 123 ("Bifurcation of
civil trials into distinct phases is a potent weapon in the judicial docket-control arsenal
75. See Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Severance of
issues is one of the trial judge's most useful trial management devices to ensure the just
and efficient determination of civil actions .... ).
76. Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1624, cited with approval in LoCicero v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 52 F.R.D. 23, 30 (E.D. La. 1971). Wright and Miller characterize
this as "[a] competent study." 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2390 & n. 15.
77. Note, Separate Trial of a Claim or Issue in Modern Pleading: Rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743, 762-63 (1955), quoted in In re Par-
is Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310, 319-20 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
78. Page & Siegel, supra note 11, at 75.
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III. APPEAL IN THE CONTEXT OF A BIFURCATED CIVIL TRIAL
Because the topic of appeal is so broad, its discussion, even in
the context of bifurcation, will be limited to its application to the
issues most often bifurcated, namely, liability and damages, with
an emphasis on Virginia law.
Bifurcation fits comfortably within the normal rules governing
the finality of orders or decrees required to support appeals.
There is a broad consensus that, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, orders directing the bifurcation of issues for trial are in-
terlocutory, and not ordinarily immediately "appealable."79 The
law in Virginia is in accord, and contains no statutes to the con-
trary.80
79. See, e.g., Day v. Davis, 989 So. 2d 1118, 1120 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008); see Gary D.
Spivey, Annotation, Appealability of State Court Order Granting or Denying Consolida-
tion, Severance, or Separate Trials, 77 A.L.R.3d 1082, §§ 2(a), 3 (1977); see also Sun Dial
Corp. v. Fink, 128 A.2d 440, 441 (Md. 1957) (citing Dixon Livery Co. v. Bond, 117 Va. 656,
658, 86 S.E. 106, 107 (1915)) (denying appeal as premature from an interlocutory order for
the trial of separate issues and upholding the trial court's discretion to enter such order).
The First Circuit has determined, however, that where an arbitration case has been bifur-
cated into liability and damages phases, the arbitral award as to liability is a final award
under the Federal Arbitration Act, and thus subject to judicial review. See Hart Surgical,
Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231, 235 (1st Cir. 2001).
80. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). Except for
judgments in certain specified cases, a "final judgment" is required for an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia to be authorized in "any other civil case." Id. An interlocutory
decree or order may support an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia if it grants, dis-
solves, or denies an injunction; requires "money to be paid or the possession or title to
property be changed"; or is one "[a]djudicating the principles of a cause." Id. The phrase
"adjudicates the principles of the cause" means that
the rules or methods by which the rights of the parties are to be finally
worked out have been so far determined that it is only necessary to apply
these rules or methods to the facts of the case in order to ascertain the rela-
tive rights of the parties with regard to the subject matter of the suit.
Thrasher v. Lustig, 204 Va. 399, 402, 131 S.E.2d 286, 288-89 (1963) (quoting Lancaster v.
Lancaster, 86 Va. 201, 204-05, 9 S.E. 988, 990 (1889)); see Ind. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Gross,
268 Va. 220, 220-21, 598 S.E.2d 322, 322 (2004) (defining a decree or order which adjudi-
cates the principle of a cause); Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Sys. Co. v. Maximus, Inc., 259 Va. 92,
107, 524 S.E.2d 420, 428 (2000) (same); Ragan v. Woodcroft Vill. Apartments, 255 Va. 322,
327, 497 S.E.2d 740, 743 (1998) (same).
The Virginia Code permits the appeal of certain interlocutory orders and decrees to the
supreme court, by permission, but it does not appear to encompass orders directing the
bifurcation of issues. § 8.01-670.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010); see also Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va. v. Carter, 267 Va. 242, 243, 591 S.E.2d 76, 77 (2004) (deciding
an appeal under Virginia Code section 8.01-670.1). Under section 8.01-670.1, the imme-
diate interlocutory appeal contemplated requires, inter alia, a written certification by the
court
that the order or decree involves a question of law as to which (i) there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion, (ii) there is no clear, controlling
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A determination of an interlocutory, but nevertheless disposi-
tive issue-for example, liability in a personal injury case, bifur-
cated from the issue of damages-in favor of the defendant would
support an appeal, since the court would thereupon issue a final
judgment in accordance with the finding." On the other hand, a
finding of liability in favor of the plaintiff in a bifurcated trial is
not a final appealable order, since damages remain to be deter-
mined.82
precedent on point in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia or the
Court of Appeals of Virginia, (iii) determination of the issue will be disposi-
tive of a material aspect of the proceeding currently pending before the court,
and (iv) the court and the parties [apparently all of the parties] agree it is in
the parties' best interest to seek an interlocutory appeal.
§ 8.01-670.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
Virginia Code section 8.01-374.1 authorizes the consolidation of actions or the bifurca-
tion of separate issues in certain multiple-party asbestos cases seeking recovery for per-
sonal injury or wrongful death. § 8.01-374.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007). Section 8.01-374.1(C) pro-
vides that any order issued pursuant to section 8.01-374.1 "shall, for purposes of appeal,
be an interlocutory order[,]" and denies the appealability of "[alny findings of the court or
jury in any bifurcated trial .. . until a final order adjudicating all issues on a specific claim
or consolidated group of claims has been entered." Id. While the General Assembly ob-
viously wanted to statutorily prescribe these appellate rules in asbestos cases, it appears
that section 8.01-374.1(C) is simply declaratory of normal appellate principles in bifur-
cated cases. See id.
81. See, e.g., Town of Vinton v. Bryant, 238 Va. 229, 231, 384 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1989)
(holding that where plaintiff fails to produce preponderating evidence of defendant's negli-
gence as a proximate cause of the event resulting in damages the defendant is entitled to
final judgment); accord W.S. Hoge & Bros. v. Prince William Coop. Exch., 141 Va. 676,
681, 126 S.E. 687, 688 (1925) (stating that "[blefore one can recover damages it must ap-
pear that some injury has been suffered" for which the defendant is liable) (citations omit-
ted).
82. See Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 899, 902-03, 407 S.E.2d 37, 39
(1991) (stating that a finding of liability in a bifurcated trial was not a final appealable
order because there was no final appealable order until the amount of the lump sum ali-
mony was determined). This is the general rule in both federal and state courts. See, e.g.,
Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 246 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that a judgment deter-
mining liability only and leaving prospective relief for another day is a "classic example of
non-finality" (quoting Taylor v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.2d 600, 602 (2d Cir. 1961))); Guy v.
Dzikowski (In re Atlas), 210 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2000); Fascetti v. Fascetti, 795 So.
2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (noting Florida's deletion of its prior Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure effective January 1, 2001, which had permitted "appeal of non-final or-
ders determining the issue of liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief'); John
Cheeseman Trucking, Inc. v. Dougan, 805 S.W.2d 69, 70-71 (Ark. 1991) (stating that or-
ders determining liability in plaintiffs favor and deferring issue of damages are not final
appealable orders); Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 535 S.E.2d 780, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(same); Krupp v. Gulf Oil Corp., 557 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (same); Bautis-
ta v. Kolis, 754 N.E.2d 820, 824-25 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (same). However, in New York,
while the rule is the same as the foregoing in cases in which a single jury hears and de-
cides, in a continuous trial, the bifurcated issue of liability, followed immediately by the
issue of damages-where there is a break between the trial on the issues of liability and
damages, or the jury is discharged after a liability trial-the defendants will be permitted
16 [Vol. 45:1
BIFURCATION OF CIVIL TRIALS
Where a nondispositive issue has been bifurcated for trial-for
example, the issue of the plaintiffs contributory negligence in a
negligence action in which the defendant's conduct is alleged to
be both negligent, and willful and wanton-the determination of
the contributory negligence issue is not a final, appealable judg-
ment. If the contributory negligence determination is in favor of
the defendant, it is interlocutory because no final determination
has been made as to the defendant's liability for his conduct, 3
which may still be established if that conduct is determined to be
willful and wanton, and the plaintiffs conduct did not rise to that
level.84 If the contributory negligence determination is in favor of
the plaintiff, it is also interlocutory because the absence of that
defense does not establish the defendant's liability.85
The foregoing reasoning applies to a determination of any other
nondispositive issue which has been bifurcated. Such a determi-
nation will, by definition, neither be one which definitely deter-
mines the rights of the parties, leaving nothing further to be done
by the court, save ministerial action, nor one which adjudicates
the principles of the cause.8 6 Further, such a determination will
not support an interlocutory appeal.8" That conclusion seems clear
from the Supreme Court of Virginia's February 27, 2009 decision
in Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of
Chesterfield County, in which Comcast attacked the County's ef-
fort to impose personal property taxes on certain of its equip-
an appeal from the interlocutory judgment on liability. See Bank of N.Y. v. Ansonia
Assocs., 656 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815, 817 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
83. See Wilby v. Gostel, 265 Va. 437, 445-46, 578 S.E.2d 796, 800-01 (2003) (stating
that allegations of both negligence and willful and wanton conduct do not represent sepa-
rate claims or theories of liability, but merely different degrees of proof that can be applied
to the same theory of liability).
84. A plaintiffs contributory negligence is not a defense where the defendant's con-
duct is willful and wanton, unless the plaintiffs conduct also rose to that level. Wolfe v.
Baube, 241 Va. 462, 465, 403 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1991). Of course, where the defendant's lia-
bility is solely predicated upon simple negligence, a determination of the plaintiffs contri-
butory negligence, if that issue is bifurcated, will require the court to enter judgment in
favor of the defendant. See Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 Va. 421, 432, 297 S.E.2d
675, 680 (1982); Smith v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 204 Va. 128, 133, 129 S.E.2d 655, 659
(1963) ("[O]ne who is guilty of negligence or contributory negligence, which causes or effi-
ciently contributes to his injuries is not entitled to recover damages therefor[e].") (citations
omitted).
85. See, e.g., Connelly v. City of Omaha, 769 N.W.2d 394, 397-400 (Neb. 2009).
86. See James v. James, 263 Va. 474, 481, 562 S.E.2d 133, 137 (2002).
87. See Comcast of Chesterfield Cnty., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 277 Va. 293, 306-07,
672 S.E.2d 870, 876-77 (2009).
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ment.8 The circuit court bifurcated the proceeding into an initial
"classification" issue, to determine whether the property was tax-
able and, if necessary, a subsequent "valuation" issue, to deter-
mine the amount of any tax." The circuit court issued an order
ruling that the property at issue was taxable as business tangible
personal property.90 Ten days later, and before the circuit court
addressed the valuation issue, which included a motion to compel
Comcast to respond to certain of the county's discovery requests,
Comcast filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court's ruling on the
classification issue.9l The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed
Comcast's appeal as improvidently granted, holding the circuit
court's ruling was not a final order, as the record clearly revealed
matters remaining for the circuit court to resolve; namely, the
motion to compel and resolution of the second issue through a
valuation of Comcast's property.2 The court also held the circuit
court's order was not appealable as an interlocutory order under
either Virginia Code sections 8.01-670 or 8.01-672.91 The circuit
court's order did not meet any of the express exceptions to the
amount in controversy requirement of section 8.01-672, or any of
the express authorizations for an interlocutory appeal contained
in section 8.01-670(B) (an appeal under section 8.01-670(A) re-
quires a final judgment).94
IV. BIFURCATION OF DISCOVERY
Whenever a court decides to bifurcate segregated issues for
separate trial, it has a concomitant, discretionary power to bifur-
cate discovery95-either sua sponte or in response to a motion.9 6
88. Id. at 296, 672 S.E.2d at 870.
89. Id. at 298, 672 S.E.2d at 872.
90. Id. at 299, 672 S.E.2d at 872.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 301, 672 S.E.2d at 873-74
93. Id. at 303-07, 672 S.E.2d at 874-77.
94. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
95. As with the bifurcation of issues, bifurcation of discovery rests with the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court. See Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir.
1985) (citations omitted); Epixtar Corp. v. McClain & Co. (In re Epixtar Corp.), No. 08-
0128-BKC-AJC, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2271, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) (citing
Harrington v. Cleburne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 935, 938 (11th Cir. 2001)); Britting-
ham v. Cerasimo, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-216-TLS-PRC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99076, at *2
(N.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2008).
96. F & G Scrolling Mouse L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 390 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
"A decision to bifurcate a case into separate trials immediately requires another equally
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Where issues are bifurcated, bifurcated discovery permits discov-
ery on the initial issue, and stays discovery on the remaining is-
sue(s).97
Many of the same factors relevant to the bifurcation of issues
also inform the decision of whether to bifurcate discovery.8 Some
courts, however, have identified additional factors, such as the
breadth of the discovery sought and the burden of the party res-
ponding to it;" the potential for simplification of discovery and
the conservation of resources;00o and whether bifurcated discovery
will promote the interests of "fairness and efficiency.""o,
Bifurcation significantly impacts discovery. Indeed, one court
has observed that simplification of discovery is "the major benefit
of bifurcation" in some cases.102 Concurring in this observation,
another court recently emphasized that "[o]ne of the purposes of
bifurcation .. . is to defer costly discovery and trial preparation
costs pending the resolution" of a potentially dispositive prelimi-
nary issue.0
While a decision to bifurcate a case into separate trials requires
the immediate decision of whether to bifurcate discovery, it does
not mandate bifurcated discovery.1o Sometimes a bifurcated trial
may not require bifurcated discovery. Further, "a court may stage
discovery so that only the more . .. expensive phases of damage
discovery, such as expert witness or third-party witnesses, or [the
more] sensitive subjects such as attorney opinions, are set for the
last part of the discovery period."105
important one-should discovery also be bifurcated and either stayed or staged." Id. (em-
phasis added).
97. See id. at 390-91 (explaining that a court may choose the order in which the is-
sues are tried to regulate the order of discovery).
98. These factors have been previously discussed, and include convenience, judicial
economy, expedience, and prejudice. See, e.g., Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d
311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing the factors considered under Rule 42(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); Devito v. Barrant, No. 03-CV-1927, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22444, at *435 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2005) (same).
99. See Chesney v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 24, 236 F.R.D. 113, 115
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).
100. F & G Scrolling Mouse L.L.C., 190 F.R.D. at 390.
101. Harris v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 261 F.R.D. 98, 111 (D.S.C. 2009).
102. Industrias Metdlicas Marva, Inc. v. Lausell, 172 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.P.R. 1997).
103. Epixtar Corp. v. McClain & Co. (In re Epixtar Corp.), No. 08-01208-BKC-AJC,
2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2271, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009).
104. F& G Scrolling Mouse L.L.C., 190 F.R.D. at 390.
105. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Federal court decisions reflect numerous instances of bifur-
cated discovery. 06 However, bifurcated discovery has not been
found in any reported Virginia circuit court decision. Neverthe-
less, given the Supreme Court of Virginia's explicit recognition of
judicial discretion to bifurcate discrete issues for separate trial, as
reflected in Dixon, Wade, and Centra Health, it is reasonable to
predict that when presented with the issue the court will give
equal recognition to the judicial discretion of Virginia circuit
courts to bifurcate discovery. 0
V. BIFURCATION OF ISSUES IN VIRGINIA CIVIL TRIALS
A. The Role of the Virginia Courts
Bifurcation in Virginia of both criminal trials and domestic re-
lations cases is an accepted procedure, but it has not been gener-
ally employed in civil trials, even though as early as 1915, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia approved of the discretio-
nary, and apparently sua sponte, bifurcation of issues by the trial
court in a civil trial. In Dixon Livery Co. v. Bond, the court re-
jected the defendant's contention that the action of the trial court,
in submitting to the jury the question of partnership "as a prelim-
inary and separate issue," was erroneous."o' The court held that
"this was a matter of procedure within the discretion of the trial
106. See, e.g., FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 603 F. Supp. 2d
1, 1-2 (D.D.C. 2009); Harris, 261 F.R.D. at 111; Kreger v. Gen. Steel Corp., No. 07-575,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12568, at *3 n.2 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2008); Caudle v. Towers, Perrin,
Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Gates v. Rohm & Haas
Co., No. 06-1743, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33257, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2007).
107. But see Report of the Boyd Graves Study Committee-Uniform Scheduling Order,
I III(6)(b), June 23, 2008, available at http://vba.affiniscape.comlassociations/11069/files/
18.%20TAB%2012%20UNIFORM%20SCHEDULING%200RDER.pdf (reflecting that the
Committee declined to make a recommendation regarding the inclusion in that Order of
bifurcated discovery between liability and damages). This appears to have been a recogni-
tion of the discretionary nature of bifurcating discovery, militating against its routine in-
clusion in a scheduling order.
108. 117 Va. 656, 658, 86 S.E. 106, 107 (1915) (emphasis added). The action was
brought by "a partnership doing business under the firm name of D.S. Bond,... to recover
the amount of an unpaid check and to protect fees and charges thereon." Id. at 657, 86
S.E. at 107. The defendant livery company filed a plea of nil debit, a plea of offset, and a
plea denying the partnership. Id. Trial was first had on the plea denying the partnership.
Id.
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court, and the defendants could not have been prejudiced by the
course which was taken."09
Dixon was relied upon in a 1962 Virginia Law Review article
for the premise that "it seems that the courts have the power,
even in the absence of statute, to order separate trials of any is-
sues. . .. "' An earlier University of Pennsylvania Law Review
article is in accord, observing that "[iun some jurisdictions the in-
herent power of the courts of law to sever any issue seems to be
assumed, as in Dixon Livery Co. v. Bond.""' Dixon has also been
cited by the Court of Appeals of Maryland for the proposition that
"a separate trial of issues is within the discretion of a trial court,
even in the absence of statutes or rules on the subject."112 Moreo-
ver, two Virginia circuit court opinions have expressly cited Di-
xon, albeit not for authority to bifurcate issues, but for the discre-
tionary authority to sever counts or claims.113
For some reason, the Supreme Court of Virginia has never
cited Dixon in any subsequent case, and until its April 17, 2003
decision in Wade, and its January 16, 2009 decision in Centra
Health, its decisions after Dixon were essentially bereft of any
109. Id. at 658, 86 S.E. at 107.
110. Note, Original Separate Trial on Issues, supra note 43, at 102 (citing Dixon, 117
Va. 656, 86 S.E. 106 (1915)). Other authorities support the inherent authority of a court to
bifurcate a civil trial on separate issues. See Swenson v. Sawoska, 559 A.2d 1153, 1156
(Conn. App. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 575 A.2d 206 (Conn. 1990); They v. Tbey, 55 A.2d 872, 873
(N.H. 1947); Robertson v. Ephraim, 18 Tex. 118, 122 (Tex. 1856); Charron v. Nw. Fuel Co.,
128 N.W. 75, 76-77 (Wis. 1910); Mayers, supra note 12, at 396. Illinois apparently takes a
contrary view, denying a trial court the inherent authority to bifurcate issues of liability
and damages over objection by the defendant, Mason v. Dunn, 285 N.E.2d 191, 192-93 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1972), but permitting bifurcation when the parties consent, Richter v. Nw. Mem'1
Hosp., 532 N.E.2d 269, 274-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). But see Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d
1319, 1345 (Ill. 1990) (upholding the trial court's refusal to bifurcate issues, but implying
that other circumstances might have produced a contrary result).
111. Mayers, supra note 12, at 396 n.18. Indeed, Mayers goes on to argue that "without
any express statutory or other authorization, our courts, unless prevented by specific re-
striction or limitation (of which no instance has been found) have the inherent power to
sever any issue for separate trial." Id. at 396. Unfortunately, Mayers utilizes the word
"sever," properly applicable to the severance of claims, to describe the distinctly different
process of ordering the separate trial of issues.
112. Sun Dial Corp. v. Fink, 128 A.2d 440, 441 (Md. 1957).
113. See Waterside Capital Corp. v. Nat'l Assisted Living L.P., 59 Va. Cir. 466, 469
(2002) (Norfolk City) (a sua sponte action by the circuit court, blurring the distinction be-
tween the bifurcation of issues and the severance of counts by proposing the latter, but
describing the procedure as the former); Song v. Ju, No. 116942, 1993 WL 946286, at *4
(Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 1993) (Fairfax County) (citing Dixon as authority to order "separate
trials," but choosing to deny plaintiffs "motion to sever" certain counts of the counterclaim
on discretionary grounds).
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discussion of, or guidance concerning, the bifurcation of issues in
civil trials,114 even where the court recognized that such bifurca-
tion had occurred in the trial court."5 Thus, in Wilcox v. Lauter-
bach Electric Company, the court noted, without criticism or ap-
proval, that the trial court entered a default judgment over the
defendants' objection, but reserved for "further adjudication" the
issue of punitive damages until it subsequently granted the plain-
tiff's nonsuit of "all issues of punitive damages."116 Similarly, in
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Sisson &
Ryan, Inc., the court observed that the parties agreed to submit
the question of attorneys' fees to the trial court following the ver-
dict, but neither approved nor criticized that procedure. 117
In Philip Morris Inc. v. Emerson, in which sixteen plaintiffs
sued the defendants for compensatory and punitive damages, the
Supreme Court of Virginia noted that, by the agreement of the
parties, the trial was bifurcated as to issues of liability and dam-
ages but made no comment as to the propriety, efficacy or autho-
rization for that procedure." The court similarly acknowledged
114. In Leech v. Beasley, 203 Va. 955, 961, 128 S.E.2d 293, 297 (1962), the Supreme
Court of Virginia upheld the trial court's rejection of the plaintiffs motion for separate tri-
als of his claims from the causes of action asserted in the counter-claims filed against him
(former Rule 3:8 permitted and current Rule 3:9(d) permits the trial court, in its discre-
tion, to order a separate trial of any cause of action asserted in a counterclaim). The court
in Leech was concerned with former Rule 3:8 and with its perception that what the plain-
tiff sought through successive trials was to assume positions in those suits which were in-
consistent with each other or mutually contradictory. Id. at 960-61, 128 S.E.2d at 297.
While Leech did not involve the bifurcation of issues, and never cited Dixon, it did note,
broadly, that it is the policy of the law to avoid wherever possible, needless delay, expense
and consumption of the court's time if these factors would be present in "separate trials."
Id. at 961, 128 S.E.2d at 297.
115. In Bremer v. Doctor's Building Partnership, 251 Va. 74, 75-76, 465 S.E.2d 787,
788 (1996), the lower court decided, prior to trial, the issue of whether warranties con-
tained in a purchase agreement remained effective after modification. Nonsuit was
granted to the plaintiff after the defendant obtained a favorable judicial interpretation of
that agreement. Id. at 80-81, 465 S.E.2d at 791. However, for reasons not disclosed in its
opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia chose to ignore the bifurcation issue, and no men-
tion of it was made therein.
116. 233 Va. 416, 418-20, 357 S.E.2d 197, 198-99 (1987).
117. 234 Va. 492, 500, 362 S.E.2d 723, 728 (1987); see also Lee v. Mulford, 264 Va. 562,
565-66, 611 S.E.2d 349, 351 (2005) ("We are aware of many cases in which the parties,
with the concurrence of the trial court, have bifurcated the fact-finding process.") (citing
Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, 266 Va. 558, 559, 587 S.E.2d 581, 582 (2003); Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Sisson & Ryan, Inc., 234 Va. 492, 500, 362 S.E.2d 723, 728
(1987)).
118. 235 Va. 380, 394, 368 S.E.2d 268, 275 (1988).
22 [Vol. 45:1
BIFURCATION OF CIVIL TRIALS
the conduct of a bifurcated trial in four subsequent cases, without
further comment thereon."'
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Virginia declined an opportunity
to address the propriety of bifurcating the issue of liability from
the issue of punitive damages when it rejected the defendant's
(appellant's) attempt to argue that the trial should have been bi-
furcated.120 The court found that the defendant's financial data
should not have been submitted to the jury until after it had first
decided the issue of the defendant's liability, on the ground that
such claim had not been preserved for appeal.121 A similar decli-
nation occurred in Majorana v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.,
where the court found that, in the absence of a record reflecting
the reason for the plaintiffs objection to the trial court's grant of
the defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial into liability and
damages phases, it could not discern whether the objection raised
on appeal had been properly preserved below.122
A case on the very periphery of bifurcation of issues is Clark v.
Kimnach, a personal injury case in which the Supreme Court of
Virginia upheld the rejection of proffered instructions that would
have required the jury to base its verdict solely on the issue of
which party's vehicle was on the wrong side of the road. 12 There
was no judicial bifurcation of the issues, including those of liabili-
ty and damages.124 Moreover, the court's reason for upholding the
rejection of the proffered instructions strangely did not discuss
the issue of bifurcation.125 The instructions were held to be impro-
per because they would have unreasonably limited the issue of
119. See Wilkins, 266 Va. at 558, 559, 587 S.E.2d at 582 (noting that the parties agreed
to reserve the issue of attorneys' fees and ask for determination by the trial court); Hens-
ley v. Dreyer, 247 Va. 25, 28-29, 439 S.E.2d 372, 374-75 (1994) (making no distinction be-
tween the bifurcation of issues and the severance of claims; the court allowed "bifurcation"
of a claim originally filed as a third-party cross-bill, after permitting withdrawal of a non-
suit thereto, subsequent to receipt of the trial court's letter opinion ruling on the underly-
ing litigation); Spotsylvania Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 243 Va. 202, 206, 415
S.E.2d 120, 122 (1992) (noting that, by pretrial order, the trial court directed that the trial
consist of three phases-liability, damages and the remaining issues); Hamer v. Sch. Bd.
of Chesapeake, 240 Va. 66, 69, 393 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1990) (noting that bifurcation of the
issue of necessity of the taking from other issues in a condemnation proceeding).
120. Hamilton Dev. Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 248 Va. 40, 44, 445 S.E.2d 140, 143
(1994).
121. Id.
122. 260 Va. 521, 529-30, 539 S.E.2d 426, 430 (2000).
123. 198 Va. 737, 741-42, 747, 96 S.E.2d 780, 784-85, 788 (1957).
124. Id. at 739-40, 96 S.E.2d at 782-83.
125. See id. at 741-44, 96 S.E.2d at 784-86.
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the proximate cause of the accident, and "deprived the jury of the
right to consider any other negligence of the operators which
might have efficiently contributed to the accident."126
The 2003 decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wade appears to
put to rest the claim of many attorneys and the concern of many
trial judges that bifurcation was not authorized by Virginia law,
except where expressly provided for by statute. 2 Indeed, the Vir-
ginia Trial Lawyers Association argued that view of the law in an
amicus curiae brief filed in Wade, 12 but the supreme court did not
adopt that position. Rather, the court stated:
A determination in a civil trial regarding the bifurcation of a jury's
consideration of issues is a matter for the trial court's discretion and
requires consideration of whether any party would be prejudiced by
granting or not granting such request, as well as the impact on judi-
cial resources, expense, and unnecessary delay.'2 9
Wade did not, however, cite Dixon, and the foregoing quote was
arguably unnecessary to the court's ruling, which upheld the trial
court's refusal to bifurcate compensatory and punitive damages
issues.3 0
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Virginia specifically discussed
the issue of bifurcation in Lee v. Mulford. 3 The court acknowl-
edged that it was "aware of many cases in which the parties, with
the concurrence of the trial court, have bifurcated the fact-finding
process."132 In Lee, the trial court refused to award attorney's fees
in a post-verdict proceeding, despite a promissory note's provision
for attorney's fees, and plaintiffs contention, made after the ver-
126. Id. at 742-43, 96 S.E.2d at 784, 785.
127. 265 Va. 383, 389, 393, 579 S.E.2d 180, 183, 185 (2003).
128. Brief for Va. Trial Lawyers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Wade, 265 Va. 383, 579 S.E.2d 180 (2003) (No. 021201), 2002 WL 33002932.
129. Wade, 265 Va. at 393, 579 S.E.2d at 185.
130. Id. at 397, 579 S.E.2d at 187; see also Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Hu-
gen, 266 Va. 188, 203, 206, 585 S.E.2d 557, 566-67 (2003) (inferentially acknowledging
that a bifurcated trial on the issues of liability and damages is authorized in discussing
the rule that a new trial on all issues is generally the appropriate remedy "when a litigant
makes a prejudicial closing argument to a jury in a non-bifurcated trial," but rejecting the
application of the rule in a non-bifurcated trial where the evidence overwhelmingly sup-
ports a finding of liability, and remanding the case for a new trial on damages only).
131. 269 Va. 562, 611 S.E.2d 349 (2005).
132. Id. at 565-66, 611 S.E.2d at 351 (citing Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, 266 Va.
558, 559, 587 S.E.2d 581, 582 (2003); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Sisson & Ryan,
Inc., 234 Va. 492, 500, 362 S.E.2d 723, 728 (1987)).
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dict, that it was customary to argue the issue of attorney's fees
post-trial."
In affirming the trial court in Lee, the supreme court rejected
the existence or enforceability of any "custom" to argue attorney's
fees post-trial, and held that "[a]bsent agreement of the parties
with the concurrence of the court, or pursuant to contract or sta-
tute with specific provisions, a litigant is not entitled to bifurcate
the issues and have the matter of attorney's fees decided by the
trial court in post-verdict proceedings."134 Inexplicably, the court
in Lee not only failed to cite either Dixon or Wade, but did not ac-
knowledge the principle exposed in Dixon, that the trial court had
the inherent power to bifurcate issues, including the issue of at-
torney's fees.'?, In a decision decided the same day, Safrin v. Tra-
vaini Pumps USA, Inc., the court applied Rule 1:1, finding that
the trial court erred in reinstating a confessed judgment entered
eight months earlier to liquidate the sum for attorney's fees,
which it had earlier awarded, but had not set a specified sum. 3 6
The court characterized its decision in Lee as "holding that absent
specific provisions in a contract or statute to the contrary, or a
prior agreement of the parties with the concurrence of the trial
court, a litigant is not entitled to have attorney's fees decided by
the court in post-verdict proceedings."3 7 Taken together, neither
Lee nor Safrin overturned Dixon or Wade, or specifically rejected
their explicit recognition of the inherent power of a trial court to
bifurcate issues. Indeed, Lee appears to turn on the particular cir-
cumstances at trial, where the promissory note was submitted to
the jury with instructions to consider it as a whole, including its
provision for attorney's fees and the plaintiffs lack of evidence
concerning such fees.3 8 When the jury's verdict provided for dam-
ages to the plaintiff, but for each party to pay its own legal fees, it
is understandable that neither the trial court nor the supreme
court was going to give the plaintiff a second bite at the apple by
permitting him to seek attorney's fees post-verdict.
133. Id. at 564-65, 622 S.E.2d at 350.
134. Id. at 567-68, 611 S.E.2d at 352.
135. Id.
136. 269 Va. 412, 415, 419, 611 S.E.2d 352, 354, 356 (2005).
137. Id. at 417 n.1, 611 S.E.2d at 355 n.1. The Supreme Court of Virginia quoted this
same language from Lee in Bates v. McQueen, 270 Va. 95, 103, 613 S.E.2d 566, 570 (2005),
a case addressing the issue of the entitlement to an award of attorney's fees and the
amount of that award, in arbitration. Bates did not involve an issue of bifurcation.
138. Lee, 269 Va. at 564, 611 S.E.2d at 350.
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In 2006, the Supreme Court of Virginia tacitly accepted that bi-
furcation of issues had occurred at the trial court in both Cangia-
no v. LSH Building Co.139 and PMA Capital Insurance Co. v. US
Airways, Inc.140 Neither Cangiano nor PAA Capital Insurance Co.
cited Dixon or Wade, nor did they discuss the principles set out
therein. Similarly, in its February 27, 2009 decision in Comcast-
discussed previously in the context of the appeal of bifurcated is-
sues-the court tacitly approved the propriety of the circuit
court's bifurcation action.141 However, Comcast neither provided
any exposition of the authority for or principles of bifurcation, nor
cited Dixon, Wade, or Centra Health.
The Supreme Court of Virginia's most recent in-depth discus-
sion of bifurcation in civil trials came in its January 16, 2009 de-
cision in Centra Health v. Mullins.142 The court held that the con-
tested issue of causation isolated the administrators of a
decedent's estate from any requirement to make a pre-trial elec-
tion between their alternative claims for wrongful death (Virginia
Code section 8.01-50), and a survival action for the decedent's
personal injuries (Virginia Code section 8.01-25).143 The court ac-
knowledged it was mindful of the defendant's contention that
such circumstances may subject a defendant to potential preju-
dice by the possibility that "the jury could conflate the differing
elements of damages from each claim in rendering a single ver-
dict.""' However, the court opined that:
[A] defendant can obviate this potential for prejudice by requesting
that the trial be bifurcated into separate proceedings to determine
liability and damages. Indeed, in a case where there is any doubt as
to when compelling an election would be proper, bifurcation is the
139. 271 Va. 171, 623 S.E.2d 889 (2006). In Cangiano, the parties, with the trial court's
approval, agreed "to bifurcate the issues and try LSH's claims for declaratory judgment
and specific performance, and then try LSH's claims for attorney's fees and costs post-
trial, if necessary." Id. at 175, 623 S.E.2d at 892.
140. 271 Va. 352, 626 S.E.2d 369 (2006). In PMA Capital Insurance Co., the trial court,
in a bench trial, "bifurcated the proceeding into an initial phase to determine if coverage
existed under the terms of the Policy [for business interruption insurance] and, if neces-
sary, a second phase to determine damages." Id. at 357, 626 S.E.2d at 372.
141. Comcast of Chesterfield Cnty., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 277 Va. 293, 298, 301,
672 S.E.2d 870, 872-73 (2009).
142. 277 Va. 59, 670 S.E.2d 708 (2009).
143. Id. at 78--79, 670 S.E.2d at 718.
144. Id. at 78, 670 S.E.2d at 718.
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most practical means to assure that each party receives a fair oppor-
tunity to present their case to the jury without prejudice to the oth-
er.1 4
5
While the decision is unclear whether the foregoing language is
dicta or a holding of a reasoned rejection of the defendant's claim
of prejudicial error, it represents clear support and approval of a
trial court's discretion to bifurcate issues where appropriate in
civil trials. The court's pointed citation of Wade's expansive view
of the application of bifurcation evidences that the court views bi-
furcation in a broad context, not narrowly limited to election of
remedy cases: "[Blifurcation. .. is a matter for the trial court's
discretion and requires consideration of whether any party would
be prejudiced by granting or not granting such request, as well as
the impact on judicial resources, expense, and unnecessary de-
lay.""6
The Court of Appeals of Virginia has also approved bifurcation
of discrete issues, although its decisions are of limited preceden-
tial authority in general civil trials. The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-107.3(A), has affirmed
the trial court's action of retaining jurisdiction in a final decree of
divorce to adjudicate the ancillary issue of equitable distribu-
tion.147 Both the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Virginia cir-
cuit courts describe this process as "bifurcation.""s Moreover, the
Court of Appeals of Virginia has indicated its broad support for
bifurcating a trial on the issues of liability and damages, albeit in
the context of a family law case.149 However, given the limited ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the court of appealso50 and the specific au-
thorization for the foregoing procedure in Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-107.3(A), these decisions do not confirm the existence of a
broad authority for Virginia trial courts to conduct bifurcated tri-
als of separate issues in non-matrimonial cases.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wade, 265 Va. 333, 393, 579 S.E.2d at 180, 185
(2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
148. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 11 Va. App. 286, 292-93, 300-01, 398 S.E.2d 82, 85, 90
(Ct. App. 1990); Walker v. Walker, 19 Va. Cir. 390, 391 (1990) (Clarke County). This was
the basis for the bifurcation of the issue of the settlement of the allotment from the issue
of accounting for rent in Gaynor v. Hird, No. 1113-93-4, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 239, at *1
(Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1994).
149. Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 899, 902, 407 S.E.2d 37, 39 (Ct. App.
1991).
150. § 17.1-405 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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In 1969, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit provided some guidance as to when Virginia law might pre-
clude bifurcation. C. W Regan, Inc. v. Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade
& Douglas applied Virginia law in determining that separate tri-
als on the issues of liability and damages are not appropriate
where "the separate and unconnected [faults] of several people
may have produced the total damage[s]."'
The issue of bifurcation of civil trials in Virginia is not the ex-
clusive province of the appellate courts. Even prior to Wade and
Centra Health, the Virginia circuit courts were conducting bifur-
cated trials of separate issues in cases where the courts found it
appropriate.15 2 The reported decisions of the Virginia circuit
courts also reflect the trial judges' utilization of this effective
docket-control device in the Circuit Courts for the cities of Nor-
folk,13 Alexandria,154 Richmond,*5 and Roanoke. 56 Bifurcation of
liability and damages was, however, denied by the Loudon Coun-
ty Circuit Court in Amax Concrete Corp. v. Isom."7 The court
made this decision primarily because it rejected the consolidation
of the four cases in which the bifurcation was sought, after ba-
lancing the advantages of judicial economy against the possible
prejudice to the parties, including the complexity of determining
and explaining the role of all of the attorneys to the jury, the re-
sultant delay of some of the cases already scheduled for trial, the
complicated nature of required instructions, and the potential for
the receipt of prejudicial evidence.'58 The Loudoun County Circuit
151. 411 F.2d 1379, 1388 (4th Cir. 1969). To support this proposition, the Fourth Cir-
cuit subsequently discussed two Virginia cases, Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel District,
196 Va. 477, 84 S.E.2d 511 (1954), and Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d
298 (1946), neither of which involved bifurcating the trial to separate the issues of liability
and damages. Regan, 411 F.2d at 1388.
152. See, e.g., City of Virginia Beach v. Nala Corp., 53 Va. Cir. 309, 338 (Cir. Ct. 2000)
(Norfolk City).
153. E.g., E. Va. Med. Sch. v. Found. for the Howard and Georgeanna Jones Inst. for
Reprod. Med., 69 Va. Cir. 452, 454 (Cir. Ct. 2006) (Norfolk City); Commonwealth v. Bay
Towing Corp., 44 Va. Cir. 466, 466 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Norfolk City).
154. E.g., Commonwealth v. Tauber, 43 Va. Cir. 5, 11 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Alexandria City),
affd, 255 Va. 445, 499 S.E.2d 839 (1998).
155. E.g., Luzik v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. Cir. 300, 300 (Cir. Ct. 1995) (Richmond
City).
156. E.g., Saunders v. City of Roanoke, 13 Va. Cir. 378, 379-80 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Roa-
noke City).
157. 20 Va. Cir. 91, 92 (Cir. Ct. 1990) (Loudoun County).
158. Id. at 92-93.
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Court has since bifurcated a trial in what it considered to be ap-
propriate circumstances.159
The Fairfax County Circuit Court has also been amenable to bi-
furcation in appropriate cases.160 In Roscigno v. DeVille, the court
bifurcated the issues of liability and equitable relief from mone-
tary damages.16 ' In Heitt v. Barcroft Beach, Inc., the court bifur-
cated the trial on issues requiring different burdens of proof-
clear and convincing versus preponderance of the evidence-to
avoid jury confusion in the application of law to its findings of
fact.162 In Landrith v. First Virginia Bank, the court bifurcated
the issues surrounding the construction of a will from matters of
surcharge and accounting. 63 In Brenco Enterprises, Inc. v. Ta-
keout Taxi Franchising Systems, Inc., the court bifurcated the
case, setting only some of the counts of the amended bill of com-
plaint for trial.16 The court in Brenco apparently took this action
sua sponte, and while it used the word "bifurcated," its action was
to sever claims, not to try disputed issues separately.165
The Fairfax County Circuit Court denied bifurcation in Collins
& Clark, Inc. v. National Cellular Partners, where the defendant
requested bifurcation on the issue of whether it was a party to the
contract that was the subject of the suit.6 6 The court expressed no
antipathy toward bifurcation, but reasoned that "having a jury
159. See, e.g., Luck Stone Corp. v. Loudoun County, 28 Va. Cir. 37, 37 (Cir. Ct. 1992)
(Loudoun County) (bifurcating the issue of whether certain sales were at wholesale for the
purpose of the Business Professional and Occupational License tax).
160. See Bremer v. Doctor's Building Partnership, 251 Va. 74, 75-76, 465 S.E.2d 787,
788 (1996), where the Fairfax County Circuit Court bifurcated and determined the issue of
the meaning of the parties' contract before the plaintiff nonsuited. See also the Fairfax
County Circuit Court decision in Ramsey v. Regency at McLean Unit Owners'Ass'n, 31 Va.
Cir. 12, 16-17 (Cir. Ct. 1993) (Fairfax County), bifurcating the issue of attorney's fees from
the other elements of damages, a procedure the court subsequently followed in Danielson
v. Thoburn L.P., No. 2004-224667, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 216, at *3-4 (Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 2005)
(Fairfax County); and AC Technical Inc. v. Morris, 48 Va. Cir. 229, 229 (Cir. Ct. 1999)
(Fairfax County); as did the Newport News Circuit Court in Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor
Cars, Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 329, 333 & n.2, (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Newport News City), rev'd on other
grounds, 226 Va. 558, 562-63, 587 S.E.2d 581, 584 (2003); and the Chesterfield County
Circuit Court in McIlavy v. CarLoanCo., Inc., 49 Va. Cir. 567, 569-70 (Cir. Ct. 1998)
(Chesterfield County).
161. 28 Va. Cir. 96, 97 (Cir. Ct. 1992) (Fairfax County).
162. 23 Va. Cir. 399, 399-400 (Cir. Ct. 1991) (Fairfax County).
163. 40 Va. Cir. 59, 61 (Cir. Ct. 1995) (Fairfax County).
164. No. 177164, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 86, at *21 (Cir. Ct. May 23, 2003) (Fairfax Coun-
ty).
165. Id.; see also supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
166. No. 112342, 1992 WL 885037, at *1-2 (Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 1992) (Fairfax County).
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deliberate on a single preliminary issue with the prospect that
the case would still go forward if the Plaintiff receives an adverse
verdict on the single issue does not promote judicial economy."e?
Other than attorney's fees, the Virginia circuit courts have bi-
furcated issues including the following: a county or city's power to
impose certain fees from the issue of whether there was a reason-
able basis for that fee;68 the width of a certain street from the is-
sue of boundary line location; 69 the issue of whether the circuit
court's prior order appointing a receiver should be declared null
and void, because it was procured by fraud, from "the other re-
maining issues, including damages";o7 0 and the issue of the effect
of plaintiffs execution of a release."'
Apparently, only one circuit court decision has addressed the
bifurcation of punitive damages. In McLean v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., the Newport News City Circuit Court denied the request of a
defendant life insurance company to bifurcate the issue of puni-
tive damages, but gave no reason for that denial."'
Prior to Wade and Centra Health, there appears to have been
only one Virginia circuit court that questioned its authority to
permit bifurcation of the issues of liability and damages. In Henry
v. Bullard & Butler, the court denied defendant Butler's motion
to bifurcate, which was based upon the alleged potential for the
significant danger of prejudice in a unitary trial."' The trial judge
stated that "[t]he Court finds that there is no statutory authority
for this Court to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages in
this particular circumstance."7 4 It is not clear whether the per-
ceived absence of specific statutory authority for bifurcating is-
167. Id. at *2.
168. Tidewater Bldgs. Ass'n v. City of Va. Beach, 14 Va. Cir. 39, 39 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Vir-
ginia Beach City).
169. Upshaw v. Town of Port Royal, 13 Va. Cir. 152, 152, 155-56 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Caro-
line County).
170. City of Va. Beach v. Nala Corp., 53 Va. Cir. 309, 338-39 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Norfolk
City).
171. Aswad v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 04-2536, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 43, at *63-65 (Cir.
Ct. Apr. 18, 2006) (Portsmouth City). The Portsmouth City Circuit Court based the bifur-
cated procedure on the Richmond City Circuit Court's decision in Bolen v. Overnite Trans-
portation, 3 Va. Cir. 345, 347-48 (Cir. Ct. 1985) (Richmond City).
172. No. 31799V-04, 2004 WL 2813474 at *2 (Cir. Ct. Aug. 25, 2004) (Newport News
City).
173. No. CL 99-564, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 152, at *1 (Cir. Ct. July 23, 2001) (Chester-
field County).
174. Id. (emphasis added).
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sues of liability and damages was merely one of the factors ba-
lanced by the Bullard & Butler court, or whether it was disposi-
tive in the court's decision. However, the fact that the court ques-
tioned its authority-in the absence of a specific statutory
enactment-to effect bifurcation in the case highlights the need
for additional legislative clarification and guidance in this area.
Regrettably, none of the legislation considered by the Virginia
General Assemblies from 1998 to 2009 dealt with this matter.175
B. Influence of the Virginia Rules of Court
While the Supreme Court of Virginia has evidenced its support
for the bifurcation of issues in civil trials, both the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia Code fail to reflect
complementary support. Despite the guidance of Dixon, Wade,
and Centra Health, the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia,
promulgated pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-3, are not
helpful in addressing bifurcation in civil cases. Rules 3:9(d) and
3:10(d) authorize the circuit court, in its discretion, to order the
separate trial of any "cause of action"' 7 asserted in a counter-
claim, or cross-claim, respectively.' The Rules are otherwise si-
175. Senate Bill 333, introduced in the 2006 General Assembly by Senator Mark D.
Obenshain (R-Harrisonburg), was not enacted. S.B. 333, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess.
2006). Had it been, it would have established a new section 58.1-5015, providing for the
bifurcation, prior to the commencement of trial, of any issue in the resolution of disputes
involving taxes administered by the Department of Taxation. Id. Such a bifurcation of is-
sues would have been permitted upon a motion of the parties or an order of the court. Id.
176. A "cause of action" has a precise meaning in Virginia law and is to be distin-
guished from "an action"; the two terms are "quite different." Trout v. Commonwealth
Transp. Comm'r, 241 Va. 69, 73, 400 S.E.2d 172, 173-74 (1991). A cause of action is "a set
of operative facts which, under the substantive law, may give rise to a right of action." Id.,
400 S.E.2d at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the definition of "cause of ac-
tion" for the purpose of res judicata see Allstar Towing, Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 231 Va.
421, 425, 344 S.E.2d 903, 905-06 (1986). An "action," on the other hand, is defined by Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-2 as including "all civil proceedings, whether at law, in equity or
statutory in nature," in circuit or general district court. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2 (Repl. Vol.
2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
177. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 3, R. 3.9(d), 3.10(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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lent as to the separate trial of issues, ' 7  a deficiency which re-
quires correction.
C. Bifurcation under the Virginia Statutes
The Virginia General Assembly has not been helpful in con-
firming the inherent judicial authority of Virginia circuit courts
to bifurcate civil trials, or in statutorily clarifying the cases and
circumstances under which the bifurcation of issues may occur. A
legislature is presumed to be familiar with the case law in effect
at the time it enacts legislation which may impact upon that
law.75 Accordingly, the Virginia General Assembly is presumed to
have been familiar with Dixon in 1977 when, as part of the revi-
sion and recodification of former Title 8 of the Virginia Code, to
current Title 8.01 (Civil Remedies and Procedure), it enacted Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-281(B).o80 However, section 8.01-281(B)
authorizes the court, "upon motion of any party, [to] order a sepa-
rate trial of any claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and of any separate issue or of any number of such
claims[.]"si Inasmuch as Dixon approved the exercise of a court's
discretionary and sua sponte authority to order the separate trial
of issues, the inclusion in section 8.01-281(B) of the modifier
"upon motion of any party" before the authority of a court to order
a separate trial of any separate issue raises the question of
178. The separate trial of issues is not addressed in either Rule 3:21(b), which provides
that any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury in the
complaint or by written demand, nor in Rule 3:21(c), which provides that in the jury de-
mand a party may specify the issues which it wishes so tried (otherwise the party is
deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable). R. 3:21(b), (c) (Repl.
Vol. 2010). The separate trial of issues is also not addressed in Rule 3:22, which provides
the procedure for trying issues: (1) by either a jury or the court when the right to a jury
trial exists and has been demanded; (2) by the court when there is no demand for a jury
trial or where the right to a jury trial does not exist; (3) by the court with an advisory jury
in certain cases; and (4) by a jury with the consent of the parties, upon order by the court,
on a claim not triable by right by a jury, with the jury's verdict having the same effect as if
trial by jury had been a matter of right. R. 3:22 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
Rules 3:21 and 3:22 would appear to provide a structure equally applicable to unitary
and bifurcated civil trials, but should be amended to specifically apply to the latter to ob-
viate any question in this regard.
179. Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 215 Va. 274, 276, 208 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1974); Da-
vis v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 617, 623 (1867); see also 2B NORMAN J. SINGER &
J.P. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50:1 (7th ed. 2008).
180. Act of Apr. 1, 1977, ch. 617, 1977 Va. Acts 1052, 1097 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-281(B) (Repl. Vol. 1977)).
181. Id. (emphasis added).
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whether the General Assembly intended to circumscribe the dis-
cretionary authority approved in Dixon.- That question was not
addressed in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wade, although had it
been, presumptively, the court would have answered it in the
negative.18 3 In any event, the reviser's note to section 8.01-281(B)
tends to cloud the plain statutory language of section 8.01-281,
because the reviser's note describes section 8.01-281(B) as provid-
ing only for the severance of claims for a separate trial,184 ignoring
the plain statutory language which includes the authority to or-
der the separate trial of any separate issue.5
A further question is raised by the language of section 8.01-
281(B), which authorizes the "separate trial of any claim, coun-
terclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and . .. of any number
of such claims."186 But section 8.01-281(B) only authorizes the
separate trial of any separate issue, 7 and does not contain the
language of Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
authorizing both the separate trial of any separate issue, or any
number of issues.as Accordingly, it is statutorily unclear whether
the judicial authority to order the separate trial of a separate is-
sue under Virginia Code section 8.01-281(B) is limited to a single
issue18 9
The Virginia General Assembly complicated the bifurcation
picture even further in its 1992 enactment of section 8.01-
374.1(B),90 which generally parallels the language of Rule 42 of
182. See id.
183. Dixon Livery Co., Wade, and Centra Health may be construed as recognizing a
court's discretion to bifurcate issues as declaratory of the court's authority at common law.
Assuming that construction of the cases is correct, section 8.01-281(B) must be read in
context with the common law, which is not considered altered or changed by statutory
enactment, unless the legislative intent be plainly manifested. Boyd v. Commonwealth,
236 Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988) (citation omitted); City of Newport News v.
Commonwealth, 165 Va. 635, 650, 183 S.E. 514, 520 (1936) (citations omitted).
184. § 8.01-281 revisers' note (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
185. Id. § 8.01-281(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. Id.
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
189. See § 8.01-281(B); see also the subsequent discussion of Virginia Code section
8.01-267.6, authorizing of the separate trial of any number of issues in multiple claimant
litigation. Id. § 8.01-267.6 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
190. Section 8.01-374.1 was originally to expire on June 30, 1995. "Acts 1992, c. 615, cl.
2, which provided for the expiration of this section on June 30, 1995, was repealed by Acts
1995, was repealed by Acts 1995, c. 14, cl. 1, effective June 30, 1995, and by Acts 1995, c.
138, cl. 1, effective March 9, 1995." Id. § 8.01-374.1 note (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in providing for the consoli-
dation of cases involving common issues of law and fact, and for
judicial discretion to order "separate or bifurcated trial of any
claim, or number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party claims, or separate issues ... ."1, Section 8.01-374.1(B) is,
however, limited to asbestos cases in which recovery is sought for
personal injury or wrongful death. 19 2 The consolidation provisions
of the statute are applicable only when more than forty such as-
bestos cases are pending in a circuit court, and its bifurcation
provisions are applicable only "in such consolidated hearings."93
Because of these latter circumstances, the bifurcation provisions
of section 8.01-374.1(B) were arguably necessary because of an
uncertainty at the time of its enactment as to whether Dixon Li-
very Co. or section 8.01-281(B) provided sufficient authority for
discretionary bifurcation in consolidated cases. While Wade and
Centra Health may have eliminated any such uncertainty, legis-
lative clarification is certainly called for.
The Virginia General Assembly had an opportunity to bring
some clarification to this situation in its 1995 session, but it failed
to do so when House Bill 2106, sponsored by then Delegate Wil-
liam C. Mims (R-Leesburg), was not enacted.11 House Bill 2106
would have added a new Virginia Code section 8.01-270.1(C),
which paralleled Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and unequivocally would have authorized the discretionary
bifurcation of issues in any civil action.'5' Significantly, subsection
191. Id. § 8.01-374.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007). This section also recognizes that such bifur-
cated proceedings may include an award of punitive damages against any defendant
where compensatory damages have been awarded to an individual plaintiff against such
defendant. Id.
192. Id. § 8.01-374.1(A)-(B).
193. Id.
194. H.B. 2106, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1995); see H. JOURNAL, House of Dele-
gates of Va., Reg. Sess. 258 (1995). While the 1995 General Assembly failed to enact House
Bill 2106, the 1997 General Assembly assigned House Bill 1565, introduced by Delegate C.
Richard Cranwell (D-Vinton), to the House Committee for Courts of Justice, where it died.
See H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. 78, 1958 (1997). House Bill 1565
would have prevented a court from ordering separate or bifurcated trials on the issues of
liability and damages over the objection of the defendant. H.B. 1565, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 1997).
195. H.B. 2106, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1995).
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two of House Bill 2106 stated that "the provisions of this act are
declaratory of existing law."196
The 1995 General Assembly also did not enact House Bill 1070,
introduced by Delegate William J. Howell (R-Fredericksburg),
originally introduced in the 1994 session and continued to 1995
by the Committee for Courts of Justice, where it died.197 House
Bill 1070 would have required that the trier of fact in civil actions
involving punitive damages, at the defendant's request, first de-
termine compensatory damages, exclusive of any evidence of pu-
nitive damages, with the latter to be heard in a separate proceed-
ing. 198
The 1995 General Assembly not only failed to enact House Bills
1070 and 2106, but it enacted the Multiple Claimant Litigation
Act, adopting standard procedures to be used in the joinder,
transfer, consolidation or other combination of civil actions
brought by six or more plaintiffs in which common questions of
law or fact predominate-so-called mass tort cases arising from
railroad derailments, airplane crashes, or oil spills."' Section
8.01-267.6, part of the Multiple Claimant Litigation Act, provides
for separate or bifurcated trials of "one or more claims, cross-
claims; counterclaims, third-party claims, or separate issues."",
Section 8.01-267.6 is limited to combined actions under the Mul-
tiple Claimant Litigation Act, and its bifurcation provisions re-
quire the motion of a party, similar to the language of sec-
tion 8.01-281(B), unlike the judicial discretion for bifurcation
authorized by section 8.01-374.1(B) in the consolidated hearings
of asbestos cases. 20 1 It may be that the bifurcation provisions of
section 8.01-267.6 were necessary because of a desire to preclude
the exercise of judicial discretion in the bifurcation of claims or
issues in non-asbestos multiple claimant litigation and, as with
section 8.01-374.1(B), because of an uncertainty as to whether ex-
196. Id.
197. H.B. 1070, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1995); see H. JOURNAL, House of Dele-
gates of Va., Reg. Sess. 300, 2265 (1994).
198. Id.
199. Act of Mar. 24, 1995, ch. 555, 1995 Va. Acts 855, 856 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-267.1 to -267.9 (Repl. Vol. 2007)). House Bill 250 was introduced by
Delegate Joseph P. Johnson, Jr. (D-Abington). See H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va.,
Reg. Sess. 162 (1994).
200. § 8.01-267.6 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (authorizing the separate trial of any separate is-
sue).
201. Compare id., with id. § 8.01-374.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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isting case law and prior statutory enactments provided sufficient
authority for bifurcation in consolidated or other combined cases.
This is, however, yet another example of Virginia's confusing sta-
tutory treatment of bifurcation, and it reinforces the need for leg-
islative clarification. After the demise of House Bill 1565 in the
1997 General Assembly, 202 no further legislative attempts have
been made to address the bifurcation of issues in civil cases. 203
VI. CONCLUSION
Consistent with Dixon, Wade, and Centra Health, and in light
of the foregoing, bifurcation of civil cases in Virginia is an area
that warrants appropriate consideration by the Virginia General
Assembly, and the Boyd-Graves Conference. While the separate
trial of issues is not, and should not be, the routine procedure for
conducting all civil trials, bifurcation is a valuable judicial tool
whose statutorily authorized use in appropriate cases deserves to
be clearly prescribed and encouraged.
202. H.B. 1565, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997).
203. Senate Bill 333, introduced in both the 2006 and 2007 sessions of the General As-
sembly by Senator Mark D. Obershaim (R-Harrisonburg), addressed bifurcation of issues
solely in tax cases. S.B. 333, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2006 & 2007); see S. JOURNAL,
Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. 59 (2006); id. at 1573 (2007).
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